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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

:

Case No. 920162-CA

FRANK L. POWELL,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1990).

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.
cautionary

Did the trial court err in failing to give a
jury

instruction

concerning

the

reliability

of

eyewitness identification?
Where defendant did not request a cautionary

eyewitness

identification jury instruction and registered no objection to the
instructions given by the court, he has failed to preserve any
objection and cannot now raise the issue for the first time on
appeal.

State v. Hoffman. 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987); Utah R.

Crim. P. 19(c) (1992).

2.

Did the trial court properly allow defendant and a

defense witness to be cross-examined as to the existence of prior
felony convictions?
"Whether a piece of evidence is admissible is a question
of law, and we always review questions of law under a correctness
standard. • . . [I]n deciding whether the trial court erred as a
matter of law, we de facto grant it some discretion, because we
reverse only if we conclude that it acted unreasonably. . . . If we
conclude that the trial court erred, we may characterize that
ruling as "an abuse of discretion," but in reality, we have found
that the court committed legal error. . .." State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah

Rule

of

Evidence

609(a)

(1992),

governing

impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime, provides:
(a) General rule.
For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during crossexamination but only if the crime (1) was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess
of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 6, 1992, defendant was tried before a jury
and convicted of burglary, a second degree felony. On February 25,
1992, the trial court sentenced defendant to 1 to 15 years in the
2

Utah State Prison, levied a fine of $1250, and suspended the prison
term upon successful completion of a 36-month probation period (R.
109-11 or addendum A).

Defendant timely appealed.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In Levan, Utah, on the evening of December 2, 1989, Pam
Jackman was unloading groceries from her car when she heard the
sound of breaking glass. She looked across the street and saw feet
going

in through

the

front window of her recently deceased

neighbor's uninhabited home (T. 71). She called her husband, who
came outside while she went inside momentarily to call the police.
She then joined her husband outside (T. 71-2, 102-03).
A few minutes later, when two people emerged through the
window, Brent Jackman yelled at them, and they "came walking over
toward meM (T. 103). One stayed out by the road, while the other
approached Mr. Jackman, who was standing on his porch.

The man

told Mr. Jackman he was looking for "quite a large sum of money"
that was supposed to have been in the home

(T. 104).

The

conversation ended after a minute or two, and the man returned to
his companion by the road.

They coth walked down the road past a

school bus that blocked them from the Jackmans1 view. Both Mr. and
Mrs. Jackman testified that they saw red brake-type lights come on,
heard doors close, and saw a big, brown car with three people in it
drive by their house, under a street light, and turn left (T. 75,
77, 106).
Mrs. Jackman told the responding officer that one of the
people in the car was wearing a sheepskin coat (T. 122). Another
3

officer assisting in the investigation testified: "Two things that
[Mrs. Jackman] was sure of was that she could remake [sic] this
particular vehicle if she had seen it again and that the individual
driving was wearing a sheepskin jacket" (T. 151).

Mrs. Jackman

testified at trial that the driver was also wearing a "dark colored
cowboy hat" (T. 75).
The following morning, Mrs. Jackman noticed a car driving
very slowly down her street and recognized it as the same vehicle
she had seen the evening before, but with four occupants (T. 7879).

She got in her van, followed the vehicle, recorded the

license plate number, returned home, and telephoned the Sheriff's
Department (T. 79-80).
The police stopped the vehicle, which was registered to
defendant's son.

Defendant, the driver, was arrested for driving

under the influence of alcohol and for burglary (T. 132). He was
wearing a black cowboy hat at the time of his arrest, and later,
when the vehicle was being inventoried, he asked officers if he
could retrieve his sheepskin coat from the car (T. 130). Two other
people in the car were also arrested and charged with burglary.
At

trial,

Pam

Jackman's

testimony

focused

on

the

similarities in clothing and body type of the man she had seen
driving the car the evening of the burglary and the next morning.
She volunteered that she "couldn't really see" his face (T. 75-76).
Brent

Jackman's

testimony

focused

on the description

of the

vehicle. He stated that he "was concentrating on the vehicle" and
"didn't really look at the people in the car at all" (T. 115).
4

Other evidence was introduced at trial to show that the
vehicle's tire tracks matched tracks found at the site of the
burglary, that a cigarette butt found in the burglarized home
matched items of the same brand found in the car, and that boot
prints found at the site matched those of the other two passengers
who were arrested with defendant (T. 130, 133-35).
The defense put on three alibi witnesses, in addition to
defendant, all of whom testified that defendant was in Provo
playing cards at the home of a friend at the time of the burglary.
Defendant further testified that he drove his truck home late in
the evening (T. 176) and then left again around midnight in his
son's car with the two other men who were found with him the next
day1 (T. 169). The three of them drove to St. George to pick up
defendant's brother.

On the way home, the group stopped in Levan

and drove slowly through the town, trying to locate a truck
defendant's son had purchased from him (T. 171).

As they were

leaving town, the police stopped them.
SUMMARY C? ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the trial court should have
given

a cautionary

instruction

to the

fallibility of eyewitness testimony.

jury, warning

of the

In order for an eyewitness

instruction to be mandatory, however, the identification must be a
central issue in the case, and the defense must request the

1

Defendant testified that the men were acquaintances who
showed up at his home around midnight looking for a place to sleep.
Defendant's girlfriend didn't want them to stay if defendant was
leaving, so defendant took them along to St. George (T. 167-68).

5

instruction.

State v. Long, 721 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1986).

Here,

defendant failed to propose such an instruction for the court's
consideration (R. 58-70) and failed to object to the instructions
that the court gave

(T. 229-30 or addendum

B).

Defendant,

therefore, has waived consideration of the issue for the first time
on appeal.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in
allowing defendant cind one of defendant's witnesses to be crossexamined

as

convictions.

to

the

existence

Defendant

and

asserts

nature

that

this

of

prior

felony

information

was

irrelevant and that it "made these individuals look unreliable in
the eyes of the jurors" (Br. of Appellant at 6). While, indeed,
the information may have discredited defendant and his witness, the
testimony was properly admitted pursuant to rule 609(a)(1) of the
Utah Rules of Evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT REQUEST THAT THE
TRIAL
COURT
GIVE
AN
EYEWITNESS
JURY
INSTRUCTION AND DID NOT OBJECT TO THE
INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE GIVEN, HE HAS WAIVED
CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL.
Cautionary jury instructions on eyewitness testimony are
required in Utah "whenever eyewitness identification is a central
issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the
defense."

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986).

case, defendant failed to request the instruction.

In this

His proposed

jury instructions do not even peripherally raise the issue of
6

eyewitness identification (R. 58-70). In addition, the court asked
counsel three times if there were any objections to the jury
instructions, and defense counsel responded consistently that there
were not (T. 229-30 or addendum B).

Under such circumstances,

defendant has waived consideration of the issue on appeal.

State

v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d at 504.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED CROSSEXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT AND A DEFENSE WITNESS
CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF PRIOR
FELONY CONVICTIONS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE
609(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
Evidence of prior convictions may be used to impeach a
testifying defendant's credibility as a witness as well as the
credibility of a witness other than the defendant.

State v.

Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990). To be admissible under
this

rule,

the

prior

conviction

must

fit

into

one

of

two

categories:
1) it is "punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year under the law under
which he was convicted, and the court
determines that the probative value of
admitting
this
evidence
outweighs
its
prejudicial effect to the defendant1' or;
2) it involves "dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment."
Utah R. Evid. 609(a).

To ensure that the information solicited

under rule 609(a) is used only for impeachment purposes and that
defendant is not convicted of past, rather than present, crimes,
the inquiry into prior convictions is limited to "the nature of the
crime, the date of the conviction and the punishment." State v.
7

Tucker, 800 P.2d at 822.
In this case, only the first category of conviction is
involved.

Both defendant and his witness, Poncho Valdez, were

asked on cross-examination if they had ever been convicted of a
felony. Defendant admitted to two burglaries, and the prosecution
asked no follow-up questions (T. 174). Mr. Valdez admitted to "a
couple" of felonies, specifically theft of copper wire.

In

response to the prosecutor's follow-up question, "Any burglaries?",
he responded,

"When

I was a

juvenile, yes"

(T. 197).

The

prosecutor then went on to other matters.
Defendant argues that this testimony was prejudicial and
should

not

have

been

admitted.2

To

flesh

out

defendant's

unarticulated argument, he seems to be asserting that the trial
court erred as a matter of law in permitting the testimony because
the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the resulting
prejudice to defendant.

Defendant has not asserted that the trial

court failed to engage in the balancing required by rule 609(a) nor
has he described the prejudicial effect beyond the bare assertion
that it "made these individuals look unreliable in the eyes of the
jurors" (Br. of Appellant at 6). 3
2

Defendant also asserts on appeal that the testimony was
irrelevant. Because he did not raise this ground in the trial
court (R. 230 or addendum B), he has waived it before this Court.
State v. Belqard, 811 P.2d 211, 213-214 (Utah App. 1991).
3

Defendant is, of course, correct in this assertion. Rule
609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is captioned "Impeachment by
evidence of conviction of crime," and its first subsection begins
with the words, "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a
witness. . .." Plainly, one of the purposes of cross-examination
is to call into question the credibility of witnesses, especially
8

In reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court applies
a correctness standard, but vests some discretion in the trial
court. This Court will reverse only if it concludes that the trial
court

"acted

unreasonably

in

probativeness and prejudice]."

striking

the

balance

[between

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,

781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
In this case, the record indicates that, in the course of the
trial,

the

court

held

an

off-the-record

bench

conference

specifically to discuss the admissibility of defendant's and Mr.
Valdez's prior convictions (T. 230-31 or addendum B).

On the

record, at the end of the trial, the court reviewed the scope of
the questioning it had authorized, which clearly fell within the
narrow limits set by State v. Tucker.

Although the court did not

articulate its probative value/prejudicial effect determination on
the record, an appellate court "upholds the trial court even if it
failed to make

findings on the record whenever it would be

reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings."
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 (Utah 1991).

Here, where a

bench conference was held for the specific purpose of discussing
the admissibility of prior convictions, it is reasonable to assume
that the court found that, based on the evidence before it, the
probative value of

the evidence outweighed

any prejudice to

defendant.
In order to overturn a trial court's findings, it is the
appellant's responsibility to marshall all of the evidence and
where the defense relies on an alibi theory.
9

"then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings of fact."

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198,

199-200 (Utah 1991). Where, as in this case, defendant has failed
wholly to marshall the evidence in support of the facts, this Court
leaves the facts undisturbed.

State v. Chavez, 198 Utah Adv. Rep.

52, 53 (Utah November 3, 1992).

Absent any record support for

defendant's bald contention that the court's ruling was incorrect,
there is simply no indication that the court acted unreasonably.
Its ruling, therefore, should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant
identification

jury

did

not

request

instruction

and

a
did

cautionary
not

eyewitness

object

to th€>

instructions as given. He has, therefore, waived consideration of
the issue on appeal.
The trial court properly allowed cross-examination of
defendant and one of his alibi witnesses concerning their prior
felony convictions, in compliance with the requirements of rule*
609(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

10

For these reasons, defendant's conviction

should be

affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this [0_ day of December, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A
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Pat P. Greenwood.Cierk _

Donald J. Eyre Jr., No. 1021
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Telephone: 623*1141

IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND
ORDER OF PROBATION

:
Criminal No. 273-D

FRANKLIN L. POWELL,

:

Defendant.

An

Information

having

:

been

filed

herein

charging

the

defendant, Franklin L. Powell, with the commission of the second
degree felony of Burglary.
The defendant having been convicted of said charge at a trial
held February 6, 1992.
The case was referred to the Utah State Department of Adult
Probation and Parole for a pre-sentence report. The defendant and
his attorney, Milton T. Harmon, appeared on February 25, 1992 for
the pronouncement of Judgment and Sentencing.
No legal reason having been shown why Judgment should not be
pronounced, it is the Judgment of the Court as follows:

1

Deputy

The defendant is guilty of the second degree felony of
burglary and is sentenced to serve not less than one nor more than
15 years in the Utsth State Prison and to pay a fine of $1,000.00
and pay $250.00 to the Victim's Reparation Fund.
Imposition of the prison sentence is suspended upon successful
completion of a thirty-six month probation upon the following
conditions:
1. The defendant enter into an agreement with the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation and Parole and comply strictly with
its terms and conditions.
2.

The defendant report to the Department and to the Court

whenever required.
3.

The defendant violate no law either federal, state or

municipal.
4.

The defendant serve six months in the Juab County jail

with credit given for the time already served.
5.

The defendant pay the fine of $1,000.00 or complete 200

hours of Alternative Community Service and pay $250.00 to the
Victim's Reparation Fund.
6. The defendant be required to participate in counseling or

2

no

therapy as outlined by his probation officer.
Dated this

*2

day of * ^ < ^ l * ^ / l

, 1992,

fl Distrifct Judger

z?

3

ADDENDUM B

229
consulted the requests made by the attorneys and
has granted some-- granted the substance of some.
And I think I only denied one, and that was one
that was cumulative and more of an argument
relative to the manner in which they should
proceed in their deliberations in one instance;
and the other was one of the instructions on the
evidence being-- the two classes of evidence
circumstantial and-There's one on that-- yours, that I didn't
give.
MR. HARMON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Are either of you taking

exception to any of the instructions the Court
gives?
MR* EYRE:

The State takes no

exceptions.
MR* HARMON;

The defendant takes no

exceptions.
THE COURT:

Do you have any objections--

or do you have any objections to the Court not
having given any of those that either of you have
requested?
MR. EYRE:
MR. HARMON:

The State has no objections.
None for the defendant.

Lesley Nelson, C.S.R.
784 East Skylark Drive
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (8(m
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THE COURT:

So there are no exceptions

to note on the record on the jury instructions?
MR. HARMON:
THE COURT:

No.
I guess we can get the jury

instructed and you can go ahead with your final
arguments•
MR. HARMON:

Your Honor# perhaps we

ought to put on the record now that during the
course of the trial we had a conference at the
bench regarding the State putting on the records
of two of the witnesses-- or the defendant and one
of the witness's-- the criminal record.
THE COURT:
MR. HARMON:

Right.
And we object to that. We

think that that was prejudicial.
And the Court indicated that that would be
allowed and-THE COURT:

What the Court allowed was

questioning the witness himself, if he had been
convicted of a felony and to answer one follow
through: What kind?

In two cases-- one was the

defendant himself and also Valdez-- both responded
affirmatively on those issues.
correct.

And you're

The Court did agree that Mr. Eyre could

do that.
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R.
784 East Skylark Drive
••--u QAcac\ fftoil 798-2868
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Does that refresh your memory?
MR, EYRE:
THE COURT:
MR. HARMON:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
Okay.

Anything else?

That's all.
Okay. We better get out and

get at it.
(Whereupon, at 3:30 P.M. the chamber
conference was concluded.)
(Whereupon, at 3:50 P.M. the jury returned
to the courtroom and the following
proceedings were continued:)
THE COURT:

The record will show the

jurors are all present in the jury box ready to
proceed•
And the Court is also prepared to instruct
you, ladies and gentlemen, on the law that applies
to this case at this time; afterwhich, we will
turn the time over to the attorneys and they'll
present their closing arguments.
The instructions will be oral, and you will
be able to take the written instructions into the
jury room for any further reference you may have
to them.
(Whereupon, the jury was instructed by the
Court.)
Lesley Nelson, C.S.R.
784 East Skylark Drive
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 (801) 798-2868

